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THE DESCENDANTS OF FASSIHI: A COMPARATIVE 

ANALYSIS OF RECENT CASES ADDRESSING THE FIDUCIARY 

CLAIMS OF DISGRUNTLED STAKEHOLDERS AGAINST 

ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING CLOSELy-HELD ENTITIES 

MATIHEW 1. ROSSMAN· 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been over twenty years since the Michigan Court of Appeals 
considered and decided Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, 
P.c. 1 This case involved a suit by one fifty percent shareholder (Fassihi) of a 
closely held corporation against the corporation's attorney after Fassihi was 
forced out of the business by the other fifty percent shareholder, allegedly with 
the attorney's help. Fassihi has since come to stand for the general proposition 
that an attorney who represents a closely-held business entity may owe a 
fiduciary duty, akin to that owed to a client, to each of the emity's individual 
stakeholders2 even when she does not represent them individually.3 This duty is 
especially likely to exist when the entity has a small number of stakeholders and 
is particularly likely to be implicated when the entity, or those who control it, 
asks for the assistance or advice of the attorney in taking action adverse to a 
stakeholder. Although by no means the only case of its time to address an 
attorney's duties to constituents of a "closely-held" client,4 Fassihi is the 
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Westem Reserve University School of Law. B.A., 
1992, Miami University; J.D., 1996, New York University School of Law. My thanks to Doug 
Frenkel , Mark Lekan, and Eileen Sullivan for reviewing and commenting upon the initial draft of 
this Article and to Ursula Rossman for her assistance and support through every stage of its 
production. 
l. 309 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). 
2. "Stakeholder," for purposes of this Article, essentially means "constituent," as that term 
is derined in the Comment to Rule 1.13 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct ("MRPC"), but of a "closely held entity," rather than a large publicly traded 
corporation. "Constituent" is defined in the Comment to mean "[o]fficers, directors, employees and 
shareholders ... ofthe corporate organizational client'· and "the positions equivalent to [those] held 
by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations" and applies to all 
organizations, no matter the size or complexity. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 
1 (2003). Because the cases discussed in this Article specifically address closely held entities, it 
is important to distinguish the use of the term "constituents" in this context. The term 
"stakeholder," with its connotation of equity ownership, is appropriate considering that in most 
closely held entities most or all of the constituents are equity owners. 
3. See, c.g., RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNINGLAWYERS § 56 cmt. h (2000). 
4. The terms "close," "closed," and "closely-held" are often used interchangeably as 
adjectives before "corporation" to mean corporations with a relatively limited number of 
shareholders, the shares of which are not publicly traded. 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. 
THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02 (rev. 3ded. 2002 (1971). 
Certain states further refine this general concept by providing that close corporations are those in 
which there is "substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and 
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preeminent case recognizing a stakeholder's claim of breach of fiduciary duty 
against an attorney who represents only the business. 
Twenty years after Fassihi, its central proposition has certainly not gained 
universal acceptance in the nation's courts. Some jurisdictions have flat out 
rejected it, while others have confused or combined the question of whether a 
fiduciary relationship exists between an attorney and individual stakeholder with 
the question of whether they have established a separate attorney-client 
relationship. 5 Furthermore, disgruntled stakeholders routinely assert other 
theories of fiduciary-type liability, which have also received uneven treatment in 
the courts, against business attorneys in circumstances factually similar to 
Fassihi. 
The resulting lack of certainty is disconcerting for attorneys Who represent 
closely-held entities. What is disconcerting is not that courts are developing or 
expanding theories of liability to hold accountable attorneys who clearly behave 
improperly, but rather that it is difficult to gauge where courts stand on these 
theories. Perhaps even more perplexing, the theories are not always consistent 
in their application with guidelines governing attorney behavior-in particular, 
the guidelines established by the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC,,).6 
This state of affairs could adversely impact both lawyers for closely-held . 
businesses and the clients they serve. Uncertainty regarding to whom within a 
business a lawyer owes duties could cause risk averse lawyers to avoid serving 
closely-held businesses, impose "self-protective reservations,,7 in the attorney­
client relationship, or overcompensate by considering the interests of an entity 
and each of its individual constituents whenever a significant decision needs to 
be made, even when this would not otherwise be appropriate. Less cautious 
attorneys could be subject to overbroad liability and the risk of lawsuits 
operations of the corporation" and/or where restrictions are placed on the transfer of its shares. Id. 
(citing Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 
1975»; see also BROOKE WUNNICKE, ETHICS COMPLIANCE FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 231 (1987) 
(citing Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511). 
Considering that almost all jurisdictions and the MRPC use the same or similar analysis for 
most business entities, e.g., corporation, partnership, LLC, etc., when determining an attorney's 
representational obligations, the author of this Article will use the more universal terms "closely­
held business" or "closely-held entity" rather than "closely-held corporation." See MODEL RUlES 
OFPROF' LCONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003); see also id. at R. l.J3 cmt. 1; ABA Comrn. on Ethics and 
Prof! Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361, at 2 (1991) ("There is no logical reason to distinguish 
partnerships from corporations or other legal entities in determining the client a lawyer represents.") 
5. See infra Part LB. 
6. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF' LCONDUCT (2003). 
7. This phrase appears in Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737,743 (Cal. 1976), to describe 
one consequence associated with overbroad liability in this context. The contention is that the 
lawyer will modify and/or withhold advice to an entity client to avoid any negative impact on the 
interests of individual stakeholders and thus minimize the threat of claims by disgruntled 
stakeholders. 
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whenever a stakeholder feels he or she has gotten the short end of the stick in a 
dispute relating to the business. In fact, the author's interest in this subject grew 
out of his own experiences representing small businesses and repeatedly 
encountering the ethical and professional dilemmas caused when formerly rosy 
relationships among business partners began to wither. 
In recent years, several courts have addressed claims resulting from what 
ought be referred to as the "Fassihi Scenario," i.e., when a stakeholder in a 
closely-held business contends that the actions of one or more other stakeholders 
or the entity have adversely affected him or her and that the attorney is partially 
to blame for her participation in, or even mere facilitation of, whatever took 
place. These cases are worth examining closely for several reasons. First, they 
underscore how jurisdictions continue to differ on whether and to what degree 
attorneys must heed the interests of individual stakeholders while counseling a 
business on ·a decision or course of action that directly affects stakeholders' 
interests. At the same time, the cases do indicate some uniform trends in the 
courts on the viability of particular fiduciary-based theories of attorney liability 
frequently asserted by disgruntled stakeholders and provide a good sense of 
where the law is headed. Finally, considering these cases in combination with 
Fassihi, other related caselaw, and the MRPC, provides valuable lessons for how 
attorneys can frame and conduct their representation of closely-held entities to 
reduce their potential for liability if these inherently thorny situations arise. 
Accordingly, this Article will examine three of these recent cases closely and 
then make observations about what these "descendants of Fassihi" say about the 
state of the law and how they should impact attorney behavior. To provide 
proper context for this discussion, a short summary of Fassihi and other 
contemporary responses to the issues raised in Fassihi follows. 
1. FASSIHI AND OTHER RESPONSES 
A. Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Taylor, P.e. 
The facts of Fassihi are fairly straightforward. Fassihi, a radiologist, was 
one of two fifty percent shareholders of a closely-held professional corporation.s 
The corporation formed after Lopez, another radiologist, asked Fassihi to join 
him in a medical practice at the hospital with which Lopez was affiliated. After 
practicing together for a short time, Lopez decided to cut ties with Fassihi and 
asked the corporation's lawyer to determine how Fassihi could be ousted. The 
lawyer complied and a meeting of the Board of Directors of the corporation was 
purportedly held (without Fassihi present) at which the Board voted to terminate 
Fassihi's interest.9 The Fassihi court noted some skepticism as to whether the 
Board could have taken this action, both because Lopez and Fassihi disagreed as 
to whether or not the Board had a third director in addition to them, and because 
8. Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, P.C., 309 N.W.2d 645, 647 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981). 
9. [d. 
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it seemed unusual to the court that a board could simply terminate a 
stockholder's interest. lO At the very least, however, the action resulted in 
hospital officials notifying Fassihi that he was no longer eligible to practice at the 
hospital. 11 Unbeknownst to Fassihi, but known to Lopez and the corporation' s 
lawyer, membership in the corporation was required for retention of medical staff 
privileges at the hospital. 12 
Fassihi subsequently sued the corporation's lawyer alleging legal 
malpractice, breach of "fiduciary, legal and ethical" duties, and fraud stemming 
from the lawyer's participation in Fassihi's ouster. J3 On appeal from the trial 
court's denial ofFassihi ' s motion for summary judgment, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals addressed the question of whether Fassihi had standing to bring any 
individual claims against the law firm, which claimed to represent only the 
corporation. The fraud issue aside, the court noted that the case presented it with 
a difficult question, "what duties, if any, an attorney representing a closely held 
corporation has to a 50% owner of the entity, individually ... a problem of first 
impression in Michigan." 14 
Although it agreed with the defendant that an attorney for a corporation 
represents the corporation and not its shareholders, the court held that the 
absence ofan attorney-client relationship between a corporation's lawyer and one 
of its stakeholders does not preclude the existence of a fiduciary relationship . 
between them. 1s Instead, a fiduciary relationship arises whenever 
[O]ne reposes faith, confidence, and trust in another' s judgment and 
advice. Where a confidence has been betrayed by the party in the 
position of influence, this betrayal is actionable and the origin of the 
confidence is immaterial. ... [W]hether there exists a confidential 
relationship ... is a question of fact. 16 
Not only might a fiduciary relationship be found, the court noted that such 
relationships between lawyers and stakeholders are likely to occur in closely held 
corporations "where the number of shareholders is small.,,17 In these instances, 
"corporate attorneys, because of their close interaction with a shareholder or 
shareholders, simply stand in confidential relationships in respect to both the 
corporation and individual shareholders.,,18 Fassihi's simple assertion that he 
"believed that, as a 50% shareholder .. . , defendant would treat him with the 
same degree of loyalty and impartiality extended to the other shareholder,"19 
10. ld. at 647 n.2. 
1LId. at 647. 
12. !d. 
13. ld. at 646. 
14. Id. at 647-48. 
15. Id. at 648 . 
16. ld. (internal citations omitted). 
17. ld. at 649. 
18. ld. 
19. Id. at 648 (emphasis added). 
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along with the other facts, was sufficient to "tend[ [ to show some legal duty on 
the part of the attorney to him personally.,,20 
Moreover, Fassihi's allegations regarding the lawyer's behavior-in 
particular, his active and covert participation in a plan with one shareholder to 
deprive Fassihi of the economic benefit associated with his fifty percent interest 
in the coq>oration-seemed to the court to be the type of behavior that would 
constitute a breach of duty if a fiduciary relationship existed. Accordingly, the 
court of appeals found that it could not dismiss this claim simply as a matter of 
law and remanded the case to the trial court. 21 
Fassihi is significant for at least two reasons. First, its approach was 
distinguishable from a contemporary line of cases in which the central issue in 
upholding the claims of the stakeholders of a closely-held corporation against the 
entity's attorney was whether the attorney represented the stakeholders as 
individuals.22 Both Fassihi and its contemporaries acknowledged the same 
reality, namely, that "treating a closely held coq>oration with few shareholders 
as an entity distinct from the shareholders,,23 potentially disregards a 
stakeholder's sometimes reasonable perception that the lawyer for the business 
is representing his or her interests. But rather than tying up this issue solely in 
the question of who the attorney represents, Fassihi recognized the possibility of 
a separate fiduciary duty owed to a non-client stakeholder and therefore 
potentially created an obligation on the attorney's part in many more 
representations . 
Fassihi is also significant for the standard it used to determine whether a 
fiduciary duty actually existed. Lawyers are considered to owe clients two 
primary duties-a duty of care (essentially a duty of competent representation) 
and a fiduciary duty (composed of various obligations of confidentiality and 
loyalty)?4 A separate line of cases had already established the circumstances 
under which non-client stakeholders could assert a breach of the duty of care 
against an attorney-by meeting the very narrowly applied "intended 
beneficiary" test.25 Rather than apply this standard, the Fassihi court posited that 
a fiduciary relationship existed in this context whenever someone "repose[d] 
faith, confidence and trust in another's judgment and advice.,,26 Although the 
court did not go into extensive detail about how this standard might be met, it did 
connect the standard to the stakeholder's belief of what the relationship entailed 
and, simply as stated, the "reposed faith, confidence and trust" standard would 
almost certainly be easier for a stakeholder to meet than the "intended 
beneficiary" test. Furthermore, it suggested that this type of relationship is 
20. Id. at 649 n.6. 
21. Id. at 648-50. 
22. See, e.?,., In re Conduct of Kinsey, 660 P.2d 660 (Or. 1983); In re Banks, 584 P.2d 284 
(Or. 1978). 
23. Fassihi, 309 N.W.2d at 649. 
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48,49 (2000). 
25. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text for discussion of this test. 
26. Fassihi, 309 N.W.2d at 648. 
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typical in a lawyer's representation of a closely-held entity. Again, the practical 
effect of Fassihi appeared to be the broadening of circumstances under which a 
non-client, disgruntled stakeholder could successfully assert a claim against the 
entity's attorney. 
B. Other Responses to the Fassihi Scenario 
Since Fassihi, several courts have recognized the potential for a fiduciary 
relationship between the attorney for a closely-held entity and its individual 
stakeholders in the absence of an attorney-client relationship.27 This is true not 
only in cases addressing the Fassihi Scenario, but also in attorney disqualification 
cases where a stakeholder of a business entity has successfully objected to an 
adverse party's use of the entity's attorney in litigation involving the 
stakeholder.28 It is fair to say that it is now commonplace for a stakeholder 
involved in either type of proceeding to attempt to claim the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship with the entity's attorney. Moreover, the circumstances 
under which courts have acknowledged that this fiduciary relationship potentially 
applies have gone beyond the inherently adverse stakeholder squeeze-out to 
include the execution of more routine corporate tasks.29 
At the same time, Fassihi's central proposition has certainly not been 
universally accepted. One example is Egan v. McNamara,30 decided shortly after 
Fassihi. In Egan, the D.C. Court of Appeals considered a claim of the estate of 
a majority shareholder of a close corporation against the corporation's attorney 
alleging that the attorney breached a fiduciary duty by not warning the 
shareholder about certain aspects of a shareholder's agreement that adversely 
affected his interests.3l The court replied resoundingly that the attorney only had 
obligations to the corporation, despite the fact that the attorney had previously 
represented the majority shareholder on personal matters: "[T]here was no 
fiduciary duty. [The lawyer] represented the corporation, an entity legally 
distinct from its directors, and officers, and shareholders. As [the corporation's] 
27 . See, e.g. , Johnson v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 312 (App. Ct. 1995) (holding that 
lawyer for limited partnership had fiduciary obligations to each of the partners whether or not he 
represented them individually); Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. 1994) 
(considering claim of fiduciary duty by shareholder of closely-held corporation against 
corporation 's attorney) ; Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin , Jennings, & Berg, P.c. , 541 
N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 1989) (noting, in dicta, that there is logic in proposition that lawyer for closely­
held corporation owes nonclient shareholders fiduciary duty); Collins v. Telcoa Int'l Corp., 283 
A.D.2d 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (reinstating claim of breach of fiduciary duty by minority 
shareholder against corporation's attorney); Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio 
1994) (finding lawyer for limited partnership owed duties to limited partners). 
28. E.g., Marguiles v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985) (holding that law firm ' s 
representation of limited partnership gave rise to fiduciary duty with respect to individual partners). 
29. See, e.g., Brennan, 640 So. 2d at 143 (negotiation of shareholders' agreement). 
30. 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983). 
31 . [d. at 738. 
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counsel, his obligation was to ensure that the agreement was in the best interest 
of the company, regardless of its impact on individual shareholders.'>32 Several 
other courts have found likewise, citing the inevitability of conflicts arising 
between the interests of an entity and those of its stakeholders, the impracticality 
of an attorney having to consider the interests of a potentially unlimited number 
of parties with every entity decision, and the inconsistency of such a duty with 
applicable rules of professional conduct.33 
Other courts have appeared willing to consider the claim, but reluctant to find 
in favor of the stakeholder notwithstanding compelling facts. A prime example 
is Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield. 34 In this case, a California appeals 
court overturned a trial court's decision in favor of a twenty-five percent 
shareholder (Skarbrevik) ofa closely-held corporation who was forced out of the 
corporation by the other three shareholders and the corporation's attorney. The 
court of appeals found that the facts did not support the existence of a fiduciary 
duty owed by the attorney to Skarbrevik, even though the attorney's actions were 
at least as detrimental to the ousted shareholder as in Fassihi .35 The attorney 
assisted the other shareholders in reneging on a previous offer to buyout 
Skarbrevik and then facilitated the amendment of the corporation's Articles of 
Incorporation to eliminate Skarbrevik's preemptive right to proportional 
participation in stock issuances so that the others could ultimately dilute his 
interest. In finding that the corporation's attorney owed duties only to the 
corporation and not to individual shareholders, the court specifically 
distinguished the facts at hand from Fassihi stating, "the evidence at trial 
established no such relationship of trust and confidence between plaintiff and 
defendant attorneys which would give rise to a fiduciary duty.,,36 
Generally speaking, rules governing attorney behavior do not directly address 
the Fassihi Scenario and, in fact, could very well be construed as inconsistent 
with Fassihi . Rule 1. 13(a) of the MRPC, which has been adopted in most U.S. 
jurisdictions, states that an attorney retained by an organizational client 
"represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.',37 
Section (e) of Rule 1.13 states that the "lawyer may also represent any of [the 
32. ld. at 739. 
33 . See, e.g., Rose v. Summers, Compton, Wells & Hamburg, P.C. , 887 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1994) (citing similar litany of reasons for not recognizing fiduciary relationship in this 
context) . 
34. 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App.1991). 
35. ld. at 639. 
36 . [d. at 636. 
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.13(a) (2003) ; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF' L 
RESPONSIBiliTY EC 5-18 (1981), which provides that: 
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to 
the entity and not to a stockholder .. . or other person connected with the entity. In 
advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his professional 
judgment should not be influenced by the personal desires of any person or 
organization. 
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organization's] directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other 
constituents" subject to the Rules governing conflicts of interest, but in no way 
implies that the lawyer automatically does represent any of these constituents nor 
specifies any circumstances under which the lawyer might be deemed to owe 
duties to any individual constituents. 38 In fact, section (d) ofRule 1.i3 explicitly 
directs the lawyer to clarify to constituents that he or she represents only the 
organization when it is apparent that the "organization's interests are adverse to 
those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.,,39 Read literally, Rule 
1.13 seems to say that the lawyer for a closely-held entity must follow the 
direction of those constituents authorized to make decisions for the entity, 
without concern for whether a particular decision adversely affects the interests 
of one or more stakeholders. 
In a 1991 formal opinion, the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Guidance, which is charged with interpreting the MRPC, provided 
some additional guidance on these particular aspects of Rule 1.13.40 Among 
other things, Formal Opinion 91-361 clarified that "[a]n attorney-client 
relationship does not automatically come into existence between a partnership 
lawyer and one or more of its partners," or, by extension, the lawyer and 
individual stakeholders of any type of entity.41 It also provided, however, that 
sEch a relationship could arise in ways other than just an express agreement 
between the lawyer and stakeholder, including where there is evidence of 
reliance by the individual stakeholder on the lawyer or of the stakeholder's 
expectation of personal representation. Interestingly, the Opinion itself made no 
mention of any duties owed by a lawyer to those constituents the lawyer does not 
separately represent, however, Fassihi is cited in a footnote for the proposition 
that "[i]n small partnerships, as with closely held corporations, ... the likelihood 
that the attorney representing the entity will be held to stand in a confidential , or 
fiduciary, relationship with the individual shareholders, or partners, is much 
greater.,,42 It must be stressed, however, that the Opinion did not specifically 
discuss or endorse the position of the Fassihi court, nor did it take a position on 
exactly when an attorney representing such an entity owes fiduciary duties to its 
stakeholders. In summary, the position of the ABA appears to be that a lawyer 
facing a Fassihi Scenario must act in accordance with the wishes of an entity 's 
duly authorized constituents and owes no duties of any kind to individual 
stakeholders unless he or she has expressly or impliedly agreed to represent them. 
38. MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.l3(e). 
39. ld. R. 1.13(d). 
40. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361 (1991). 
41. ld. 
42. ld. at n.S. 
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II. THE RECENT C ASES 
A. Cacciola v. Nellhaus43 
1. Facts.-This recent Massachusetts case involved a family business- four 
brothers who owned equal twenty-five percent interests in a real estate 
partnership.44 Although two of the brothers-Edward and Anthony-handled the 
day-to-day operations of the business, a written partnership agreement gave all 
four equal authority in its management and in partnership decisionmaking. After 
Anthony's death, his estate became successor in interest to his partnership share. 
Pursuant to the partnership agreement, the partnership had the option to purchase 
the share.45 Although some discussions took place among the remaining brothers 
about purchasing the share (including one between Edward and his brother 
Salvatore in which they agreed the partnership should buy it), the partnership did 
not proceed further with the matter. 
A year and a half had passed when Salvatore, to his surprise, "received a 
financial statement from the partnership's accountant showing Edward with a 
fi fty percent interest in the paltnership.,,46 Edward had purchased Anthony' s 
interest from his estate, allegedly at below market value and without notifying the 
other partners. To convince the estate to sell to him, Edward allegedly told its 
representatives that Salvatore (and presumably his other brother, David) was not 
intefested in the share. Edward closed the transaction with the assistance of the 
partnership 'S longtime lawyer, Howard NeUhaus. Not only did NeUhaus serve 
as lawyer for the transaction, but he advised Edward that Edward had the right 
and authority to purchase the share without notice to Salvatore, despite the fact 
that the partnership had the first option to buy Anthony' s share.47 When 
Salvatore asked NeUhaus for information about the transaction, NeIlhaus refused, 
claiming the information was confidential. 
Salvatore sued Edward. Soon after, Salvatore died and the executrix of his 
estate filed a separate action against Nellhaus asserting what the complaint 
termed "malpractice," but which the plaintiff initially described as a violation, 
"while purportedly acting as counsel for the partnership, [of! the obligations 
[Nellhaus] had as counsel to Salvatore, a partner in the partnership.,,48 Nellhaus 
successfully moved to dismiss the malpractice claim on the ground that "as 
attorney for the partnership, he owed no enforceable duty to Salvatore. ,,49 The 
executrix appealed, and the appellate court reversed the tr.al court' s dismissal of 
the !'1alpractice claim by reinstating the claim and restating it as a breach of 
43. 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) . 
44. Id. at 135. 
45 . Id. at 14l. 
46. Id. at 136. 
47 . ld 
48 . ld. 
49. ld. 
186 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:177 
fiduciary duty claim.50 
2. Analysis.-Ofthe three cases considered by this Article, Cacciola is most 
similar to Fassihi. The cases are factually different in that Fassihi involved the 
ouster of one fifty percent stockholder by another, while Cacciola involved a 
somewhat more benign, "secret" acquisition by one partner of an interest that 
should have first been made available to the partnership. As to the issue of the 
lawyer's role, however, the cases have conceptual similarities. In both cases, a 
disgruntled stakeholder alleged that the lawyer actively assisted another 
stakeholder in increasing his ownership of the business at the disgruntled 
stakeholder's expense. 
Cacciola, like F assihi, began with the question of whether or not the lawyer 
and disgruntled stakeholder had an attorney-client relationship in order to 
determine whether or not the stakeholder's estate had a valid claim for legal 
malpractice against Nellhaus.51 Based on the allegations of Salvatore's estate, 
the court found neither an express relationship between Salvatore and Nellhaus 
nor an instance of Salvatore's having relied upon Nellhaus' s advice which might 
give rise to an implied attorney-client relationship.52 The Cacciola court also 
specifically distinguished Massachusetts law from cases in other jurisdictions in 
which courts have recognized attorney-client relationships between lawyers and 
individual stakeholders of small, closely held entities simply by virtue of the 
lawyer's representation of the entity.53 
After finding the malpractice claim inapplicable, the court could have simply 
affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment. Instead, drawing 
upon Fassihi and dicta from a prior Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case, 
Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings, & Berg, P. C. ,54 the court 
implied an additional claim for breach of fiduciary duty against NeUhaus from 
the estate's complaint.55 This judicial activism might be read as a determined 
effort by the appellate court to address and define a duty alluded to but not 
formally upheld in Schaeffer, or as the court's concern that Nellhaus's allegedly 
reprehensible behavior might otherwise go unpunished due to poor pleading, or 
both. In any event, the court found in F assihi abundant guidance for determining 
both whether a fiduciary relationship existed between Salvatore and Nellhaus and 
how the accompanying duty might have been breached. 
In making the first determination, the Cacciola court quoted directly from 
Fassihi: . 
[i]nstances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary 
relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to 
50. [d. at 141. 
51. "In order to prove a claim of legal malpractice, the plaintiff must show that the defendant 
owed him a duty of care arising from an attorney-client relationship." [d. at 137. 
52. Id. 
53. [d. 
54. 541 N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 1989). 
55. Cacciola, 783 N.E.2d at 137. 
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arise where the number of shareholders is small. In such [circumstances] 
... the corporate attorneys, because of their close interaction with a 
shareholder or shareholders, simply stand in confidential relationships 
in respect to both the corporation and individual shareholders.56 
Then, noting simply that partnerships are similar to close corporations and that 
Salvatore was an equal twenty-five percent partner in the partnership, the court 
concluded that NeUhaus may indeed have owed Salvatore a fiduciary duty.57 In 
doing so, the court suggested this duty may exist whenever an entity has a small 
number of stakeholders. To support this proposition, the court cited dicta in 
Schaeffer as standing for the even broader proposition that "an attorney for a 
partnership owes a fiduciary duty to each partner.,,58 
As for the nature and breach of the duty, the Cacciola court looked first to 
the assertions of the plaintiff in Fassihi who claimed that as a fifty percent 
shareholder, he trusted that his corporation's lawyer would treat him with "the 
same degree of loyalty and impartiality extended to the other shareholder" and 
that the lawyer violated this trust by failing to disclose his dual representation of 
both the corporation and the other shareholder and by helping to terminate the 
plaintiff shareholder's association with the corporation. 59 Linking the facts in 
Fassihi to the case at hand, the court then stated: 
The allegations set forth in the plaintiff s complaint resemble those at 
issue in Fassihi. Salvatore, as an equal twenty-five percent partner, 
alleged that "although the defendant ... , as counsel to the partnership, 
had obligations to Salvatore, as one of the partners ... to keep Salvatore 
informed as to significant transactions affecting the partnership, 
nevertheless, [the] defendant ... did not inform Salvatore about 
Edward's negotiations and his subsequent purchase ofAnthony's former 
interest ..." Moreover, the defendant "refused to provide Salvatore with 
any details of the purchase by Edward," ....60 
In Cacciola, the fiduciary duty of "loyalty and impartiality" owed by the lawyer 
seemed to consist of, at the very least, a duty of disclosure of significant 
transactions affecting the entity. Given the size of the Cacciola partnership and 
the nature of the estate's allegations regarding the behavior ofNellhaus, the court 
found that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty should withstand dismissal.61 
Again, the court could have stopped here. The Fassihi court found a breach 
of fiduciary duty claim applicable to both the lawyer's alleged failure to disclose 
information that affected the plaintiff/disgruntled stakeholder and his alJeged 
56. [d. at 138 (quoting Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz, & Tyler, P.e., 309 
N.W.2d 645, 649 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (alterations in original». 
57. [d. 
58 . [d. at 137 (quoting Schaeffer, 541 N.E.2d at 1002). 
59. [d. at 138 (quoting Fassihi, 309 N.w.2d at 648). 
60. [d. 
61. [d. 
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active participation "in terminating plaintiff's association with the corporation" 
and using a contract to the plaintiff's detriment.62 The Cacciola COUlt used the 
lawyer' s breach of fiduciary duty to encompass only Nellhaus's failure to 
disclose, but suggested a separate theory of liability-"aiding and abetting 
Edward 's breach of his fiduciary duty to Salvatore"-that Salvatore's estate 
could have asserted to cover NeUhaus's participation in Edward's purchase of 
Anthony' s share.63 
In explaining the basis for such a claim, the court pointed out that partners 
owe to each other a duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty" and even more so in 
this case "because of their familial relationship.,,64 Accordingly, Edward owed 
Salvatore a fiduciary duty that he breached when he secretly purchased 
Anthony's interest. In linking Nellhaus to Edward' s improper behavior, the court 
cited Spinner v. Nutt,65 a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case, for the 
circumstances under which a person may be liable for participating in a 
fiduciary' s breach. Liability arises when a person "knew of the breach and 
actively participated in it such that he or she could not reasonably be held to have 
acted in good-faith.,,66 NeUhaus then could be liable not only for the breach of 
his own duty to Salvatore, but also for his involvement in Edward's breach of 
duty so long as, presumably, he would be unable to demonstrate that he 
reasonably believed ~is advice to Edward and his work on the transaction was 
appropriate. 
Although Cacciola borrowed heavily from Fassihi, it appears that 
Massachusetts courts have a significantly more expansive view of attorney 
liability in the Fassihi Scenario. According to Cacciola, a lawyer automatically 
owes a fiduciary duty to each stakeholder of a client that is a close corporation, 
partnership or other similar entity. Furthermore, an attorney encounte11ng a 
Fassihi Scenario might also face liability for aiding and abetting one individual 
stakeholder's breach of fiduciary duty to another stakeholder, even in the absence 
of a relationship with the disgruntled stakeholder. 
B. Chern-Age Industries, Inc. v. Glover67 
1. Facts.-The most recent of the three cases discussed in this Article is a 
South Dakota Supreme Court case which involved a shady business venture 
initiated by an entrepreneur named Dahl. Dahl convinced two businessmen, 
Pederson and Shepard, to invest in a business he was starting called Chem-Age 
Industries. 68 According to their agreement, the investors would contribute cash, 
62. Fassihi, 309 N.W.2d at 648. 
63. Cacciola, 733 N.E.2d at 13Q. 
64 . ld. 
65. 63 1 N.E.2d 542 (Mass. 1994). 
66. ld. at 546. 
67. 652 N.W.2d 756 (S.D. 2002). 
68. ld. at 761. 
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arrange loans for the business, and serve as its Board of Directors.6: Dahl would 
act as its chief executive officer responsible for day-to-day operations.70 
The investors gave Dahl some money up front in exchange for a promise of 
shares, but insisted that Dahl get an attorney to formally set up a corporation 
before going any further. 71 Dahl engaged Glover, an attorney with whom he had 
worked on various transactions and lawsuits during the previous twenty years, 
to do the work?! Glover prepared the necessary paperwork, which listed 
Pederson and Shepard as incorporators and Glover as registered agent of the 
corporation, and in November 1997, the business was incorporated as Chern-Age 
Industries, Inc. ("Chem-Age,,).73 After this, Pederson obtained a large loan for 
Chern-Age and the business began purchasing equipment.74 After handling the 
incorporation, Glover acted as Chem-Age' s attorney on at least one other 
matter-a lawsuit filed against it-and occasionally held himself out as its 
attorney in conversations with outside parties. 75 
By early fall of 1998, Pederson and Shepard began to notice that Dahl was 
accumulating large balances on company credit cards for what appeared to be 
personal expenses and became suspicious that he was swindling them.76 They set 
up a meeting with Dahl and Glover at which they were surprised to learn not only 
that Dahl and Glover believed Dahl alone owned Chern-Age, but also that the 
two were in the process of negotiating the sale of all of the assets of Chern-Age 
to another company.77 Dahl told Pederson and Shepard that they would be repaid 
78for their investments out of the proceeds from the sale of Chem-Age's assets .
Needless to say, litigation ensued against both Dahl and Glover. The suit 
against Glover, brought by Chern-Age as an entity and Pederson and Shepard 
individually, asserted several different claims including legal malpractice and 
breach offiduciary duty.79 Glover moved successfully for summary judgment on 
these two claims on the ground that he had only represented Dahl and, therefore, 
owed no duties to Pederson, Shepard or Chem-Age.8o Glover maintained that 
shortly after incorporation Dahl had told him that Pederson and Shepard were no 
longer interested in the business and that Dahl would run Chern-Age as a sole 
proprietorshipY The plaintiffs appealed raising several questions relating to the 
nature of the duties Glover owed to them and whether Glover had breached any 
69. ld. at 761-62. 
70. Id . 
71. ld. at 761. 
72. ld. 
73. ld. at 762. 
74. ld. 
75. ld. at 767. 
76. id. at 762. 
77. ld. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 761. 
80. Id. a t 763. 767. 
81. Id. at 776. 
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of the duties owed.82 
2. Analysis.-The Chern-Age court's first task in addressing what duties 
Glover owed, and to whom, was to attempt to sort out exactly who Glover 
represented. After considering Glover's role in setting up the corporation and the 
fact that he continued to perform work and occasionally held himself out as 
working on behalf of Chern-Age after its incorporation, the court was persuaded 
that Glover may have represented the corporation and that the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment to the contrary.B3 The court was unpersuaded, 
however, by Pederson and Shepard's assertion that Glover represented each of 
them individually because Glover simply had too little direct contact with them 
for either to have reasonably believed he was represented by Glover. 
Accordingly, the court found that Glover may have owed duties arising from an 
attorney-client relationship to Chern-Age, but not to the investors. 84 
While more could be written just on these findings, what makes Chern-Age 
important for purposes of this Article is the considerable time the court spent 
discussing three "nonclient," fiduciary-based claims Pederson and Shepard might 
have had against Glover as Chem-Age's attorney. The first, which the court 
termed a Nonclient Third-Party Beneficiary claim, was technically a claim for 
negligence (i.e. a breach of duty of care), and not breach of a fiduciary duty.85 
However, it is worth considering here, given the context in which it was 
brought-Pederson and Shepard were not really questioning Glover's 
competence in incorporating Chern-Age, but rather his failure to protect them as 
constituents of the entity. In this way, this claim is very similar to the fiduciary 
claims brought in other cases considered herein. 86 In fact, it is not uncommon for 
stakeholders suing entity attorneys to use negligence claims to encompass breach 
of fiduciary duty claims and vice-versa.87 
In essence, the Nonclient Third Party Beneficiary theory provides that in 
certain circumstances a lawyer owes a duty of care to a nonclient when the 
nonclient is either invited or intended to benefit from the lawyer's services to his 
or her client.88 In the case at hand, Pederson and Shepard might claim that they 
were invited to rely individually on Glover's services to the corporation or that 
Dahl intended that Glover's representation benefit them primarily and could then 
assert a valid legal malpractice claim against Glover. 
While the Chern-Age court was intrigued enough by this theory of liability 
to spill considerable ink discussing it, the court ultimately found that Pederson 
and Shepard had not presented sufficient evidence to support it as a technical 
matter under the standards set forth for such a claim in section 51 of the 
82. [d. at 763. 
83. Id. at 768. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 769. 
86. Third party negligence claims were also asserted by the plaintiffs in Cacciola, supra Part 
II.A, and Richter v. Vall Amberg, supra Part n.c. 
87 . RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GoVERNlNG LAWYERS § 49 cmt. c (2000). 
8R.ld.§51. 
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Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.89 Clearly, other concerns 
also influenced the court's decision. The court laid out several policy reasons to 
explain the court's reluctance to relax the rule of strict privity in attorney 
malpractice cases: 
First, the rule preserves an attorney's duty of loyalty to and effective 
advocacy for the client .... Second, adding responsibilities to nonclients 
creates the danger of conflicting duties .... Third, once the privity rule 
is relaxed, the number of persons a lawyer might be accountable to could 
be limitless .... Fourth, a relaxation of the strict privity rule would 
imperil attorney-client confidentiality.90 
These policy reasons are nearly identical to the ones cited in cases rejecting the 
availability of a breach of fiduciary claim in the Fassihi Scenario. The court also 
looked at the nature of the services Glover provided-primarily setting up the 
corporation-and contrasted it with a scenario where instead of just preparing 
paperwork, he was called upon to advise and warn "individual constituents of all 
the consequences and dangers inherent in investing in a corporation.,,91 
Considering Glover's role and contact with Pederson and Shepard, the court did 
not see justification for providing them with a legal malpractice claim.92 
Next, the court turned to whether Glover owed and breached a fiduciary duty 
to Pederson and Shepard even though he did not represent them. At the outset, 
it stated that no South Dakota court had previously recognized the claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty "involving lawyers and nonclients," although it 
acknowledged that other jurisdictions had, including some "in the corporate 
sphere.,,93 As an example, the court cited Fassihi.94 While not discrediting 
Fassihi, the test the Chern-Age court found in South Dakota caselaw for 
determining whether a fiduciary duty existed was significantly more extensive 
than Fassihi's "reposed trust and confidence" standard: 
To ascertain a fiduciary duty, we must find three things: (1) plaintiffs 
reposed "faith, confidence and trust" in Glover, (2) plaintiffs were in a 
position of "inequality, dependence, weakness, or lack of knowledge" 
and, (3) Glover exercised "dominion, control or influence" over 
plaintiffs' affairs.95 
Perhaps because of this, the court found no fiduciary relationship between Glover 
and the stakeholders. "Pederson and Shepard have submitted no evidence to 
show how they were in a confidential relationship with Glover, where they 
depended on him specifically to protect their investment interests, and where 
89. Chern-Age, 565 N.W.2d at 771. 
90. ld. at 769 (citations omitted). 
91. ld. at 770-71 . 
92. ld. at 771. 
93. Id. at 772. 
94. Id. at 773. 
95. Id. at 772 (citation omitted). 
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Glover exercised dominance and influence over their business affairs."9A Further, 
"[a]side from simple avowals that they believed Glover was watching out for 
their interests, their claim that Glover was entrusted with explicit responsibility 
for their investments is 'factually unsupported. ",97 In analyzing the stakeholders' 
claim in this way, Chem-Age differs sharply from Cacciola, which seemed to 
imply that a fiduciary duty extending from the lawyer to stakeholders exists 
whenever a lawyer represents a closely held entity. It differs from Fassihi as 
well not only by using a more exacting standard, but by requiring evidence of 
reliance beyond just simple avowals. F assihi' s appeal might very well have been 
unsuccessful had it been judged by the Chem-Age court. 
Glover, however, was not out of the woods yet. As in Cacciola, the Chem­
Age court moved immediately on to consider whether Glover might be liable for 
"aiding and abetting" a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the disgruntled 
stakeholders by Dahl, even though Pederson and Shepard apparently never 
alleged this themselves.98 Once again, the Chem-Age court used a different and 
arguably more onerous standard. While the Cacciola court had prior state 
caselaw to rely upon, Chem-Age looked instead to the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts section 876(b), which provides generally that "[flor harm resulting to a 
third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he 
knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial 
assistance or encouragement to the other,,,99 and to Granewich v. Harding,100 a 
1999 Oregon Supreme Court case which applied this Restatement provision to 
the Fassihi Scenario. 101 In Granewich, the attorney helped controlling 
shareholders squeeze out a minority shareholder by advising and assisting them 
to take certain steps specifically designed to dilute the minority shareholder' s 
interest (for example, amending the corporation's bylaws to eliminate certain 
voting requirements that protected the minority shareholder's interest from 
dilution).lo2 The Granewich court overturned a lower court's decision that the 
minority shareholder could not bring a claim for aiding and abetting the majority 
shareholders' breach of their fiduciary duty to him against the attorney in "the 
absence of any duty flowing directly from the lawyers to plaintiff.",o3 
The Chem-Age court had no difficulty finding that Dahl's behavior, as 
alleged by the plaintiffs, clearly breached fiduciary obligations Dahl owed to the 
company and its investors. lo4 Nor did the court have much doubt that material 
questions of fact existed as to whether Glover substantially assisted Dahl in 
96. ld. at 773. 
97 . ld. 
98 . ld. 
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). 
100. 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999). 
101. Chem-Age, 652 N.W.2d at 773-74. 
102. Granewich, 985 P.2d at 791-92. 
103 . ld. at 790, 794 (citing Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067 (Or. Ct. App. 1997)). 
104. Chem-Age, 652 N.W.2d at 774. 
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breaching those obligations. 105 Its concern, again policy-driven, was whether it 
was wise to hold Glover partially responsible for Dahl's use of his services. 
Holding attorneys liable in this way, the court posited, "poses both a hazard and 
a quandary for the legal profession.,,106 Echoing the concerns it expressed earlier 
when considering the Nonclient Third Party Beneficiary claim, the court 
cautioned that overbroad liability for attorneys could affect the quality of legal 
services in this context, as attorneys might modify, or refrain from providing, 
advice on matters that affect the rights of third parties. 107 These "self protective 
reservations" hurt the attorney's client by depriving it of competent, unfettered 
advice from its legal counsel. 108 At the same time, the court acknowledged that 
the right to unfettered advice is not an absolute one-"iawyers should not be free 
to substantially assist their clients in committing tortious acts.,,109 
The court concluded that these competing concerns could be reconciled 
through the strict application of Restatement section 876. First, section 876 
requires that the attorney "substantially" assist or encourage a breach of the 
fiduciary duty. 110 To be implicated, the attorney must provide "substantial 
assistance" to the actual breach of the duty-merely acting as a scrivener or 
providing routine legal services to someone who then uses them to breach a duty 
is insufficient. 11l As an example, the court noted that in Granewich the lawyer 
did more than just advise the controlling shareholders about their options but 
actually participated in the wrongful acts by making misrepresentations and 
amending the bylaws in a way that violated the law.1I2 Second, the attorney must 
know-actually or constructively-of the fiduciary's role as fiduciary and that 
the fiduciary's conduct "contravenes a fiduciary duty.,,113 Constructive 
knowledge might suffice especially when the aider and abettor have maintained 
a long-term or in-depth relationship with the fiduciary. 114 When applied 
correctly, the court believed that the standard would protect a lawyer from 
meritless claims by every stakeholder disadvantaged by the lawyer's advice. I J5 
In the aiding and abetting claim, the Chern-Age court at last found a hook on 
which Pederson and Shepard could potentially hang their hats. Given the facts 
at hand, the court found that Glover's p31ticipation in the formation of the 
corporation, acquiescence in Dahl ' s treatment of the business as a one-man 
operation, and his long term relationship with Dahl, provided reason enough to 
proceed further on the questions of whether Glover knew or should have known 





110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). 
111. Chern-Age, 652 NW.2d at 774-75. 
112. Id. at 775. 
113. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 em!. e (1979». 
114. Id. 
115. [d. at 774. 
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of Dahl's fiduciary duty to the duped investors and whether he substantially 
assisted in the breach of that duty.116 This holding then suggests, as Granewich 
did, an alternative way to find an attorney liable to stakeholders she does not 
represent and to whom she does not owe a fiduciary duty. The Chern-Age court's 
measured and careful review of three separate nonclient, fiduciary-based claims 
makes it an important update to Fassihi. 
C. Richter v. Van Amberg 117 
1. Facts.-At issue in this New Mexico federal district court case were the 
actions of a lawyer who represented a real estate development partnership called 
Santa Fe Partners II ("SFP"). SFP had two, clearly unequal, partners-Gibbens 
and Richter. Gibbens provided most of the capital for the venture and 
consequently was largely in control. SFP's partnership agreement designated 
Gibbens as the managing partner and provided that Richter was entitled to twenty 
percent of the partnership's profits only after Gibbens had recovered his initial 
investment. 118 
The opinion in this case does not set forth the rest of the facts very clearly. 
What is clear, however, is that the relationship between Gibbens and Richter 
ultimately began to fracture. Gibbens believed that Richter had deceived him in 
taking an undisclosed commission on certain property, presumably associated . 
with the partnership and was also disappointed by Richter's general 
performance. 119 Gibbens approached the partnership's lawyer, Van Amberg, 
about representing him personally and, in the course of so doing, expressed his 
dissatisfaction with Richter and his desire to dissolve SFP to avoid paying 
Richter any profits. 120 Van Amberg declined to represent Gibbens, citing his 
obligations to SFP as an entity, but continued to represent the partnership and 
said nothing to Richter. 121 
Subsequent to this, Van Amberg facilitated a sale of some of the 
partnership's property (the "MAH Sale"). Gibbens insisted that it be done 
without Richter's knowledge or consent and technically, Richter's consent was 
not required under SFP's partnership agreement. 122 When Richter's consent to 
the MAH Sale later became necessary to complete its closing (and presumably 
Richter objected because he had not yet received any profits from the venture), 
Van Amberg brokered an accommodation between Richter ~nd Gibbens which 
allowed the sale to go forward. 123 After the MAH Sale, Gibbens sued to dissolve 
116. ld. at 776. 
117. 97 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (O.N.M. 2000). 
118. ld. at 1259. 
119. ld. at 1262. 
120. ld. 
121. /d. 
122. Id. at 1259. 
123 . ld. 
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SFP. 124 Richter counterclaimed and the partners ultimately settled the dissolution 
of the partnership when Richter accepted payment of $110,000.125 
The case at issue arose out of claims Richter later asserted against Van 
Amberg, after learning that Gibbens and Van Amberg had spoken about 
Gibbens ' s plans to dissolve SFP prior to the MAH Sale. Richter sued Van 
Amberg asserting a catalog of claims, including legal malpractice, breach of 
fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. 126 Underlying 
all of Richter's claims were his contentions that Van Amberg facilitated the 
MAH Sale while aware that Gibbens wanted to terminate the partnership without 
compensating Richter and failed to disclose this to Richter. Richter claimed he 
would not have agreed to the MAH Sale had he known Gibbens' intentions. 127 
Van Amberg countered that Richter's contentions did not amount to any 
. wrongdoing on Van Amberg's part and moved for judgment as a matter of law. 128 
Van Amberg claimed that Gibbens, as SFP' s managing partner, had full authority 
under the partnership agreement over partnership matters, without any right of 
consent by Richter, and, therefore, Van Amberg only owed a duty of disclosure 
to Gibbens. 129 Moreover, Van Amberg claimed that ethical rules prohibited him 
from disclosing what he learned about Gibbens's desire to dissolve the 
partnership to Richter because it was a communication by a person "who consults 
a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services.,,130 
2. Analysis.-The Richter court granted Van Amberg's motion, agreeing 
that, even assuming Richter's version of the facts, there was no legally sufficient 
basis to support a finding for Richter on any of his claims. 131 What is distinctive 
about the Richteropinion, especially when compared with Cacciola and F assihi, 
is its analytical approach to determining whether Van Amberg owed a fiduciary 
duty to Richter. In concluding he did not, the court never contemplated that a 
fiduciary relationship might exist between the two, separate and apart from an 
attorney-client relationship. In this way, Richter bears very little resemblance to 
Fassihi. The fact that the Richter court employed several different and 
contradictory tests for determining Van Amberg's obligations to Richter, 
however, prevents it from representing a clear alternative to the Fassihi 
approach. 
It is significant that the Richter court began its analysis of Richter' s breach 
of fiduciary duty claim by quoting from a treatise on legal malpractice-"[the] 
breach of fiduciary duty claim is also one for legal malpractice.,,132 For in this 
124. [d. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. at 1255-56. 
127. /d. at 1259. 
128. [d. at 1258. 
129. [d. at 1259. 
130. /d. at 1262. 
131. Id.atI258. 
132. ld. at 1261 (citing 2 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 14.1.5 (4th ed. 1998 
Supp.» . 
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court's OpInIOn, such a claim was inextricably tied to an attorney-client 
relationship. For Richter, this meant the court would not recognize his claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty against Van Amberg unless Richter demonstrated an 
attorney-client relationship existed between them. 
The court provided support for this approach, and distanced itself from 
Fassihi, by citing two recent New Mexico cases in which courts had held that the 
attorney for a closely-held entity owed no special duties to its constituents by 
virtue of that representation .J33 Most compelling was the deci.sion in Delta 
Automatic Systems, Inc. v. Bingham,134 a 1998 case, in which the court 
considered claims by the two sole shareholders of a corporation that the 
corporate attorney owed them a special duty because he represented them in 
matters apart from the corporation. The court stated unequivocally: "In 
representing Delta, Defendants did not owe the Quintanas, as shareholders, any 
special duty above and beyond their duties to the corporation. This is so even 
though the Quintanas were the sole shareholders of Delta and Defendants knew 
that the Quintanas' livelihood depended on Delta's success."135 Had the Richter 
court stopped here, we could simply assume that New Mexico law on this issue 
is similar to other jurisdictions which have concluded that attorneys owe no 
fiduciary or other duties to the stakeholders of a closely-held entity absent 
evidence of a separate attorney-client relationship between them. 
Instead, however, the Richter court also pointed to Rice v. Stntnk,136 a 1996 
decision of the Indiana Supreme Court, which provided that partnerships should 
be treated differently than corporations for purposes of determining who the 
attorney represents, as guidance in reaching its decision. This approach, while 
contrary to Rule 1.13 of the MRPC and the law in the vast majority of U.S. 
jurisdictions, is still followed in a few states . It employs the aggregate, rather 
than entity, theory of representation when analyzing a lawyer's representation of 
a partnership and other unincorporated associations, holding that an attorney who 
represents a partnership actually represents each partner jointly rather than the 
partnership as an entity. As the court in Rice noted, however, pursuant to 
partnership law, partners may essentially contract away this fiduciary and legal 
relationship with the entity's attorney by entering into a partnership agreement 
that delegates their rights to the management of the partnership to a manager or 
managing partner. 137 Following this logic, the Richter court found that, indeed, 
Richter might have had individual claims against Van Amberg had he not entered 
into a partnership agreement with Gibbens delegating full goveming authority on 
all partnership matters to Gibbens. 138 Because he did so, the court reasoned, Van 
Amberg's fiduciary obligations of confidentiality and undivided loyalty flowed 
directly to the partnership as represented by its managing partner and not to 
133. Id. at 1263. 
134. 974 P.2d 1174 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). 
135 . Id. at 1178 (cited in Richler, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1263-64). 
136. 670 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind 1996). 
137. [d. at 1288-89. 
138. Richler, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. 
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either of the partners individually.139 
This purely contractarian approach differs from Fassihi in which such 
ohligations are not automatically bestowed upon stakeholders, but created 
through the relationship that the individual stakeholder has with the attorney. 
However, it also is clearly inconsistent with the Richter court' s simultaneous use 
of Delta as controlling precedent. 
In the absence of a fiduciary relationship with Richter, Van Amberg's 
!Jehavior, which initially might have appeared problematic, is viewed in a 
different light. The law only imposed on him a duty to his client-the 
partnership. Citing New Mexico's version of Model Rule l.13, the court stated, 
"As the partnership lawyer, Mr. Van Amberg's responsibility was to the entity, 
specifically the managing partner."140 Therefore, Van Amberg's "secret" 
facilitatIOn of the MAH Sale was not wrongful as Gibbens, pursuant to the 
partnership agreement, "had the authority to convey partnership real 
property ... on behalf of the partnership without Plaintiff Richter's consent.,,141 
Van Amberg's non-disclosure of Gibbens's intent to dissolve the partnership 
without giving Richter any profits was also appropriate because Van Amberg 
only had a duty of disclosure to the partnership, not individual partners. Further, 
and perhaps more plausibly, because Gibbens disclosed it in the course of 
requesting Van Amberg to represent him personally, it was a confidential 
attorney-client communication. 142 
Clearly, the Richter court was convinced that the facts, as much as the law, 
justified its decision in this case. Even under Richter's version of the facts, the 
court believed that Van Amberg' s behavior lined up with applicable professional 
standards. Richter and Gibbens were both sophisticated businessmen who 
retained separate counsel during their disputes. 143 When Gibbens approached 
Van Amberg about personal representation, Van Amberg declined and told 
Gibbens to retain separate counsel. 144 When Van Amberg participated in the 
negotiations between Richter and Gibbens it was at the request of Richter' s 
counsel. 145 Towards the end of its opinion, the court revealed an unwillingness 
to drag Van Amberg into Richter's sour break-up with Gibbens. It noted that 
both Gibbens and Richter "had colorable claims against one another for breach 
of fiduciary duty" and "have strong personalities" and "it is highly unlikely that 
Mr. Van Amberg could have predicted what either would do regarding their 
ongoing partnership disputes.,,146 Accordingly, the court quickly dispensed of 
Richter's final claim that the lawyer aided and abetted Gibbens's breach of 
fiduciary duty to Richter, noting again that Van Amberg's actions met 
139. ld. 
140. ld. at 1263 (citing N.M. R. PROF. CONDUCT 16-113 (A)). 
141. Id. at 1262-63 . 
142. ld. at 1262. 
143 . Id. at 1264. 
144. Id. at 1266. 
145 . ld. at 1264. 
146. ld. at 1266. 
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professional standards and that "no evidence suggests that Mr. Van Amberg's 
non-disclosure was the proximate cause of damages to Plaintiff Richter." 147 
At the end of the day, it is difficult for the reader to decipher on what 
principle the Richter decision rests. Was it that Van Amberg, as lawyer for the 
partnership, owed no duties to Richter, that Richter contracted away any duties 
Van Amberg owed to him, that Van Amberg's adherence to applicable 
professional standards absolved him of liability, or some combination of these 
three? The answer is unclear. Notwithstanding, this case is significant for its 
discussion of several approaches to the question of the existence of a fiduciary 
duty in the Fassihi Scenario not discussed in Fassihi, Cacciola or Chern-Age. 
m. LESSONS LEARNED 
So what helpful guidance might be gleaned from these "descendants of 
Fassihi" for those who represent closely held businesses? Interests among 
business partners frequently diverge and most significant decisions a business 
makes have the potential to affect constituents differently. Must lawyers in this 
arena practice with an excess of caution, with one eye constantly on the 
stakeholder who is getting the short end of the stick? 
A. Where Does the Law Stand? 
The initial question posed by this Article was: Under what circumstances is 
a lawyer who represents a closely held entity potentially susceptible to fiduciary­
type claims asserted by individual, nonclient stakeholders? The cases analyzed 
in Part II demonstrate that there still is no uniformity of opinion on this issue. 
This is especially true with the respect to the narrower question of how widely 
has Fassihi's central proposition been accepted. At one end of the spectrum is 
a case like Cacciola in which the language ofthe court's opinion insinuates that 
a lawyer owes a fiduciary duty to non-client stakeholders whenever the lawyer 
represents a closely-held entity. At the other end of the spectrum is the Richter 
court which, apparently, would not recognize a claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
in the absence of an established attorney-client relationship. Somewhere in the 
middle is Chern-Age which, like Fassihi, requires the demonstration of a 
relationship of trust, not quite arising to the level of an attorney-client 
relationship. Even on the question of what constitutes a relationship of trust, 
courts apply varying standards as a comparison of Chern-Age and Fassihi 
indicates. The recent cases are representative of the diversity of viewpoints 
expressed by courts that have considered this claim during the twenty years since 
the Fassihi decision. 148 
147. [d. 
148. E.g., Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(considering breach of fiduciary claim but finding absence of relationship of trust between lawyer 
and constituent); Rose v. Summers, Compton, Bells, & Hamberg, P.e., 887 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1994) (finding lawyer for limited partnership not liable and owed no fiduciary duty to limited 
partners); Arpadi v. MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio 1994) (finding lawyer for limited 
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An important corollary issue for those jurisdictions which acknowledge the 
existence of a fiduciary duty in this context is: what does the duty consist of? 
Is it identical to the fiduciary duty lawyers owe clients, less comprehensive or 
altogether different? The fiduciary duty resulting from an attorney-client 
relationship is really an amalgam of several separate obligations, including 
"safeguarding the client's confidences and property; avoiding impermissible, 
conflicting interests; dealing honestly with the client; adequately informing the 
client; following instructions of the client; and not employing adversely to the 
client powers arising from the client-lawyer relationship."149 The limited 
treatment this issue has received suggests that the duty owed to a nonclient 
stakeholder closely resembles that owed to a client. In Cacciola, the duty 
encompassed NeUhaus's (the attorney) failure to deal honestly with Salvatore by 
not informing him "about Edward's negotiations and his subsequent purchase of 
Anthony's former interest.,,15o In Fassihi, it was the lawyer's behavior in acting 
to deplete Fassihi's property (i.e. his economic interest in the corporation).151 
The Chem-Age court discussed the fiduciary duty to a nonclient as though it were 
the duty owed to a client. 152 Other cases and the Restatement have insinuated the 
same. 
One way in which the three recent cases stand apart from Fassihi, which is 
also an indication of how the jurisprudence has developed, is that they each 
address a separate, additional claim: the attorney's 'aiding and abetting' of 
another stakeholder in breaching his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff. This is not 
because the facts in Fassihi are less compelling than the other cases for such a 
claim, but rather because it is only in the last twenty years that courts have begun 
to recognize the liability of an attorney for this tort. 153 In fact, it is only since 
Granewich v. Harding, 154 a 1999 decision of the Oregon Supreme Court, that this 
type of claim was upheld in a case involving the Fassihi Scenario. Granewich 
is partially distinguishable from Fassihi, because it involved an attorney who 
began representation of a corporation only after the majority shareholders had 
commenced the plan to oust the minority shareholder. The minority shareholder 
had no direct contact with the attorney and therefore could not reasonably claim 
that he had established a relationship of trust and confidence with the attorney. 
This distinction, however, certainly did not stop the Cacciola, Chem-Age, and 
Riehle r courts from considering an aiding and abetting claim, in two of the cases 
partnership owed duties to limited partners). 
149. REsTATEMENT (THiRD) OFTHE LAW GoVERNINO LAWYERS § 49 cmt. b (2000) (internal 
references omitted). 
150. Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). 
151. Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, P.C., 309 N.W.2d 645, 646 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981). 
152. Chern-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756 (S .D. 2(02). 
153. Bryan C. Barksdale, Note, Redefining Obligation in Close Corporation Fiduciary 
Representation: Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty in 
Squeeze-Outs, 58 WASH & LEE L. REv. 551, 554 (2001). 
154. 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999). See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. 
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even when the plaintiffs had not initially pleaded it. 
The presence of the aiding and abetting claim in the above cases represents 
a clear, recent trend of courts towards treating it not only as complimentary to the 
more direct breach of fiduciary duty claim, but, perhaps in many instances, as a 
better way to determine an attomey's liability in the Fassihi Scenario. There are 
several possible reasons for this. First, caselaw is better developed as to what 
duties majority stakeholders owe to minority stakeholders than it is as to what 
duties an attorney for a closely-held entity owes to individual nonclient 
stakeholders. Because many Fassihi Scenario cases involve a concomitant 
breach of duty by a majority stakeholder, the court can move directly on to the 
more concrete inquiry of whether the attomey knowingly participated in the 
majority stakeholder' s breach rather than having to address whether a fiduciary 
relationship existed between the attorney and the disgruntled stakeholder and 
whether the attomey's actions violated this relationship. Along these lines, and 
as has already been demonstrated above, jurisdictions differ significantly on 
whether or not, and when, attorneys owe fiduciary duties to nonclients. The 
aiding and abetting claim addresses the attorney's reprehensible behavior 
notwithstanding the court's position on these other issues. Finally, as one 
commentator recently pointed out, liability for breach of a fiduciary duty does 
not require a mental state and is therefore essentially a strict liability claim. ISS 
To be liable for aiding and abetting someone else's breach, one must have done 
so knowingly and therefore this claim may better fit scenarios like those in all 
three of the recent cases in which the plaintiff seeks redress against the attomey 
for affirmatively and intentionally acting against his interest. 
In summary, whether or not, as well as when, an attorney is susceptible to 
fiduciary claims in this context continues to be largely dependant upon the 
jurisdiction in which the attorney practices. It appears, however, that in a 
growing number of jurisdictions, a lawyer embroiled in a Fassihi Scenario will 
be susceptible to liability if she knowingly and substantially assists one or more 
stakeholders in breaching their fiduciary duties to another stakeholder. Other 
attempts to extend fiduciary type liability, like the nonclient third party 
beneficiary claim alleged in all three of the recent cases, have generaliy failed . 
B. Possible Responses by the Attorney 
Given the judicial uncertainty, it is tempting to seek a straightforward, 
failsafe answer to this thorny representational dilemma. One particularly risk­
averse approach would be for the lawyer to simply not involve herself in matters 
that adversely impact the interests of one or more stakeholders. This might 
involve declining to accept representation of closely held businesses where the 
interests of stakeholders appear to be even remotely at odds, refusing to advise 
an entity client (including its control group) on decisions that could negatively 
affect one or more stakeholders and recommending that all affected constituents 
seek separate counsel whenever any intracorporate dispute arises. 
--------------------------_._._ . .. ­
155. Barksdale, supra note 153, at 559. 
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Another possible approach would be for the lawyer to attempt to consider 
and reconcile the interests of an entity and eash of its stakeholders on all 
decisions . This utilizes the "group" or "aggregate" theory of organizational 
representation, which some legal commentators and courts have asserted (as 
Cacciola implicitly does) is appropriate when lawyers represent closely held 
entities. 156 In essence, this approach requires that the lawyer treat each 
stakeholder as a co-client pursuant to Model Rule 1.7 and refrain from further 
representation if the interests of these co-clients are "fundamentally 
antagonistic." Because the lawyer would owe representational duties to each 
stakeholder, when faced with a potential Fassihi Scenario, she could not assist 
an entity or control group in taking action adverse to anyone stakeholder. 
While accomplishing the lawyer's objective of reducing fiduciary liability 
exposure, these approaches both raise legal and practical problems. The most 
fundamental of these is that neither approach comports with the "entity" theory 
of representation embodied in Model Rule 1.13, and its Model Code counterpart 
BC 5-18, which together are the basis for the standards for professional conduct 
adopted in every state pertaining to a lawyer's representation of an organization. 
The selection of the "entity" theory over the "aggregate" theory by the drafters 
of the MRPC followed from their conclusions that the former had supplanted the 
latter in jurisdictions throughout the United States and that treating stakeholders 
as co-agents of the entity rather than co-clients more accurately reflects basic 
principles of corporate law. IS? ABA Formal Opinion 91-361 clarified that these 
principles and the entity theory applies equally to partnerships, closely held 
entities and other types of associations as it does to corporations. 158 Inherent 
within Rule 1.13 is the notion that the lawyer, in following the will of the entity 
as expressed by its "duly authorized constituents," may assist in a course of 
action adverse to one or more of the entity's stakeholders. 159 
As a practical matter, following either of the two approaches discussed above 
as a general rule would hinder a lawyer's ability to meaningfully and effectively 
represent closely held business clients. Under either approach, the lawyer would 
have to tailor her advice to omit the discussion of options that could potentially 
negatively impact a stakeholder and thus would deprive an entity client of an 
opportunity to fully consider all options and make fully informed decisions. The 
"risk-averse" approach would require identifying all situations in which interests 
potentially diverge-ranging from inherently contentious ones, like the decision 
156. "Reality inhibits application of the entity representation rule of the closed corporation ." 
WUNNICKE, supra note 4, at 232; see also Lawrence Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the 
Close Corporation: Toward A Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELLL. REv. 466 (1989). 
157. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, LAW AND LAWYERING 17.6 to 
17.13 (3d ed. 2001). 
158. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361 (199 1). 
159. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003) (requiring lawyer to explain to 
constituent that entity is client when lawyer is "deaJing with" constituent against whom entity ' s 
interests are adverse). 
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to involuntarily buyout a minority shareholder, to more apparently mundane 
tasks like the preparation of organizational documents that supposedly express 
the agreement of stakeholders-and then recusing herself. 160 It is hard to believe 
a lawyer could ever identify all such situations or that a client would find it 
valuable to retain a lawyer who did. In the same vein, while under certain 
circumstances it is either advisable or required that a lawyer for a business 
recommend that constituents at odds with one another consult separate counsel, 
in many cases, it is neither required nor helpful to do so, especially when 
considering the attendant costs, both financial and otherwise, of adding more 
lawyers to the fray. 
Although assisting an entity client to reconcile the interests of its 
stakeholders is sometimes in the entity's best interests, a purely "aggregate" 
approach to corporate representation is often unfeasible. Because the lawyer 
owes duties to multiple clients rather than one, the potential for pervasive and 
numerous conflicting duties increases with each additional stakeholder. 
Ostensibly, the lawyer owes obligations of confidentiality to each stakeholder 
and to the entity itself, which could make communications with anyone 
stakeholder a potential minefield. Additionally, as previously mentioned, the 
lawyer may feel compelled to impose self protective restrictions on her advice 
to avoid any chance of impairing one client's interests, which ultimately hinders 
the development of an open, trustworthy relationship between the lawyer and 
entity. 
C. A Case-by-Case Strategy for Reducing Exposure to Fiduciary Liability 
A more appropriate response for containing fiduciary liability should be 
firmly rooted in applicable caselaw and professional standards. To this end, the 
recent cases examined in this Article are quite instructive. 
The recent cases suggest that the course of dealing that the attorney and 
client engage in is often a very important factor. For example, in Chern-Age, 
Pederson and Shepard's claim of a fiduciary relationship with Glover failed 
because there was "no evidence to show how they were in a confidential 
relationship with Glover, where they depended on him specifically to protect 
their investment interests, and where Glover exercised dominance and influence 
over their business affairs.,,'61 Simple avowals that they believed Glover was 
watching out for their interests were insufficient absent evidence "that Glover 
was entrusted with explicit responsibility for their investments."'62 
Similarly, in dismissing the notion that Van Amberg owed any duties to 
Richter individually, the Richter court looked to their interactions and found no 
specific evidence of Richter's reliance on Van Amberg in partnership matters; 
160. See Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (considering claim that 
lawyer breached fiduciary duty to shareholder in preparation of shareholders agreement); see also 
Egan v. McNamara, 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983) (same). 
161. Chern-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 773 (S.D. 2002). 
162. ld. 
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in fact, Richter retained separate counsel to protect his interests during his 
negotiations with Gibbens. 163 The court found Van Amberg's response to 
Gibbens's request for personal representation telling of how he viewed his 
relationship with the stakeholders-he declined and referred Gibbens to outside 
counsel, stating that he could only represent the partnership.l64 Later, he urged 
Gibbens to disclose certain partnership matters to Richter. 
Cacciola, with its insinuation that a fiduciary relationship between an 
attorney and stakeholder of a closely held entity might be inherent, did not 
explore how the partners of Cacciola Associates perceived NeUhaus nor point to 
this as a factor. In a few jurisdictions, course of dealing will not be a factor. One 
other case, however, is instructive. In Brennan v. Rujner, a Florida appeals court 
affinned the dismissal of a claim of breach of fiduciary duty by a "disgruntled 
minority shareholder" against the attorney ofa closely-held corporation, after the 
corporation's other two shareholders voted the minority shareholder out of the 
corporation using a procedure agreed upon in their shareholders agreement. 165 
In concluding that the attorney did not have a fiduciary relationship with the 
disgruntled shareholder resulting from his preparation of the shareholders 
agreement, the court found persuasive the fact that the attorney had told the 
shareholders that he only represented the corporation in drafting the agreement. 166 
Defining upfront the nature of the attorney's relationship with the constituents 
of an entity client is also consistent with several sections of the MRPC, including 
Rule 1.2 (c), Rule 1.7 and Rule 1.13 (d). 
For the most part, the logic in these cases closely resembles the "reasonable 
expectations" approach adopted in most jurisdictions and by the ABA for dealing 
with the closely related issue of determining whether an attorney and an 
individual stakeholder have established a separate attorney-client relationship. 167 
This approach looks at the facts of each particular case to determine whether an 
express or implied relationship has arisen based on the stakeholder's reasonable 
expectation of the role of the attorney, including whether "there was evidence of 
reliance by the individual [stakeholder] on the lawyer as his or her separate 
counsel, or of the [stakeholder's] expectation of personal representation.,,168 
Similarly then, an attorney who would like to proactively decrease the likelihood 
of creating a fiduciary relationship with individual stakeholders should address 
this issue at the beginning of a representation by clearly stating to each that the 
attorney will only represent the interests of the business entity and not those of 
any of the individual stakeholders. This would best be taken care of in writing, 
163. Richter v. Van Amberg, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1265 (D.N.M. 2000). 
164. ld. at 1262. 
165. Brennan, 640 So. 2d at 143. 
166. ld. at 146-47; see also Buehler v. Sbardellati, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104, 108 (1995) 
(upholding lawyer's limitation of role in formation of limited partnership to merely documenting 
transaction and not representation of each partner's individual interests). 
167. See ABA Conun. on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility, Formal Op. 91 -361 (1991). 
168. ld. 
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ideally in an engagement letter. 169 For the risk averse attorney, the letter could 
gc. even further and provide that undertaking the engagement in no way creates 
any type of a fiduciary relationship with any of the stakeholders. 
Of course, putting this in writing is one thing and following it is quite 
another. As several commentators have noted, it is often difficult in the course 
of representing a closely held entity to separate the entity and its stakeholders. 170 
But difficult does not mean impossible. The attorney who wishes to rebut a 
future contention that she has a fiduciary relationship with any of the entity ' s 
stakeholders would be well advised to adhere to "corporate"/"entity" formalities. 
These formalities include somewhat mundane, yet important, practices like 
ensuring that direction given by a constituent of the client is consistent with the 
constituent' s authority and has been properly approved by the entity, insisting 
that constituents adhere to rules and procedures set fort in the entity's governance 
documents and applicable law and even reinforcing that the entity is the client 
when communicating with constituents (e.g., by addressing letters to constituents 
in their official capacities). They also include obeying requirements directly 
imposed by the MRPC such as explaining the identity of the attorney's client 
when it is apparent that the entity's interests are adverse to those of one or more 
of its stakeholders and keeping paramount the best interest of the entity in each 
and every facet of the representation. Each of the foregoing are examples of 
sometimes overlooked standards of good corporate legal practice. 
Finally, it seems almost too obvious and a little circular to suggest that an 
attorney can better protect himself from liability associated with a Fassihi 
Scenario by obeying the law. And yet it should be of some comfort for attorneys 
to know that courts typically have only upheld the types of claims discussed 
throughout this Article when the attorney has transgressed or assisted someone 
to transgress a law either external or, more often, internal (i.e. constitutional law 
of the entity). 
Cacciola is a good example of this point. The attorney for the partnership 
engineered a transaction that allowed one partner to acquire a deceased partner' s 
interest. What made this otherwise innocuous action improper was that it was 
carried out in violation of a partnership agreement granting the partnership the 
first option to purchase the interest. Similarly, in Chern-Age, Glover's assisting 
Dahl in selling the assets of the business might otherwise not have been 
problematic. But the fact that Glover illegally notarized the signatures of 
Pederson and Shepard on the corpo!"ation' s Articles of Incorporation and then 
facilitated the sale of Chem-Age's assets without observing any corporate 
formalities seemed to convince the court that the stakeholders might have a 
viable claim against Glover. 
On the other hand, the Richter court dismissed all of the claims brought 
against Van Amberg even though the court believed that Richter had a colorable 
169. For a'1 example of language to use in engagement letters in this context. see CHESTER 
ROHRUCH ET AL., ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, at app. 2B (6th ed. 
2001 ). 
170. See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 156. 
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claim against Gibbens for breach of fiduciary duty and Van Amberg assisted 
Gibbens on several matters that Richter alleged to be wrongful. The court noted 
that Van Amberg's behavior seemed consistent both with applicable ethical 
standards and SFP's partnership agreement, which designated Gibbens as the 
managing partner with decision-making authority on almost all partnership 
matters. 
Although the results in these cases are in part a reflection of the jurisdiction 
in which they were brought, the matter is certainly not out of the attorney's 
hands. Adherence to those provisions of the MRPC that apply to organizational 
representation, corporate/entity formalities and applicable law will greatly reduce 
an attorney's exposure to fiduciary liability with respect to individual 
stakeholders of an entity client. 
